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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2(a)-3(2)(d) and (f) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Did the Trial Court reach its decision based on facts 
not in evidence, leading to incorrect interpretations of other 
facts? 
Standard of Review: The decision as to what evidence was 
actually presented is a matter of law. In reviewing a trial 
court's determination of a question of law, the appellate 
court reviews the decision for correctness and affords no 
deference to the trial court. Provo River Water Users' Assoc, 
vs. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah, 1993). 
2. Did the trial court improperly admit into evidence 
hearsay statements? 
Standard of Review: The decision as to whether evidence 
is hearsay is presented as a matter of law. In reviewing a 
trial court's determination of a question of law, the 
appellate court reviews the decision for correctness and 
affords no deference to the trial court. Provo River Water 
Users' Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah, 1993). 
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3. Did the Court improperly deny the admission of 
Defendant's evidence, thereby preventing Defendant from 
putting on a defense? 
Standard of Review: The decision as to whether evidence 
is hearsay is presented as a matter of law. In reviewing a 
trial court's determination of a question of law, the 
appellate court reviews the decision for correctness and 
affords no deference to the trial court. Provo River Water 
Users' Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah, 1993). 
Standard of Review: 
4. Did the City meet its burden of proving the Defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? 
Standard of Review: The decision as to whether evidence 
is hearsay is presented as a matter of law. In reviewing a 
trial court's determination of a question of law, the 
appellate court reviews the decision for correctness and 
affords no deference to the trial court. Provo River Water 
Users' Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah, 1993). 
5. Did Defendant's trial attorney provide ineffective 
assistance such that Defendant was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel? 
2 
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Standard of Review: The decision as to whether evidence 
is hearsay is presented as a matter of law. In reviewing a 
trial court's determination of a question of law, the 
appellate court reviews the decision for correctness and 
a f f o r d s i i c: i e f e r e n c e t o 11 i e 1: r i a J c o u r t, P r o v o R i v e r W a. t e r 
Users' Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah, 1993). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
T h e p a r t: i e s ' v e r s i o n s : • f 11 I e f a c t s :> f \ vh a 1: o c c i i r r e d o n 
July 30, 1997 are very different. Defendant testified that, he 
allowed the alleged victii i i, : •. J-.,J-._L^ :; .-,:..>.:.-.:., ' . LOIII 
him an apartment in his basemenL. initially, Lhe rental 
period war *--r be ^nly for ^ f^v; -^ays, but Ms. Anderson 
u] tirr."3rr ' - V : P ^ V : -r - * , . * ; * ;. 
On the night o; L U J V '-Jl/ - 'v" , Defendant was irrigating 
the acreage -•:.. •-••.,:,..! ; .  - :•. ,,:.-- . : ,, . ; ..::. ; .j. —. . . . -: ) 
a.m. of the 29 t h of Ju]y. Defendant/o v^iie nad recently had 
surgery, and Defendant was spending most of his time that day 
c a r i n g f o r h e r a n d mc • n i t o r i n g 1: h e i i: r :i g a t I o n . L a 1: e i r t: h e 
evening, he decided to go to a movie at: the theater located 
b e 1 Ii r id i Ii s 1 Iouse . Because 1: Ie 1 Iad beer i i ri igatii Ig, Defendant 
was wearing sandals. Defendant had earlier served Ms. 
Anderson with at least three eviction notices, but had been 
unable to locate Ms. Anderson to talk to her about her moving 
out of the apartment. 
On his way back from the movie, Defendant saw Ms. 
Anderson's children in a car in the driveway by the house. 
After being told that she was at home, Defendant went down the 
outside stairs to try to talk to Ms. Anderson. He could see 
Ms. Anderson sleeping on the couch through the sliding-glass 
door; after several minutes of knocking and the dog barking, 
Ms. Anderson finally woke up. As soon as she saw Defendant, 
she got up and lurched to the door, and after opening the 
door, started attacking Defendant and cursing at him for 
calling the police on her for abandoning her children. 
Defendant pushed Ms. Anderson away from him, and backed up to 
a tree about 30 feet away from the door. Ms. Anderson kept 
coming at Defendant all while he was backing up, and her 
little dog was nipping at Defendant's feet. At one point, the 
dog actually bit Defendant, who then picked up the dog, 
telling Ms. Anderson that he was going to take the dog to the 
pound so it could be put under observation for a few days to 
determine if it had rabies. Throughout this time, Ms. 
Anderson continued to attack Defendant. He finally was able 
to get up the hill to where the garage was and put the dog in 
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the garage and close the door. Contrary to Ms. Anderson's 
allegations, Defendant never threatened to kill the dog. 
Rather, Defendant told Ms. Anderson that she could pick her 
dog up in 10 days, after the quarantine period had run to 
determine if it had rabies. Further, during the struggle with 
Ms. Anderson, the Defendant's glasses were knocked off his 
face. Defendant found by the tree in his driveway the next 
morning, broken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court found the Defendant guilty of the assault, 
choosing to believe in whole the testimony of Ms. Anderson, 
and giving no credit whatsoever to the testimony of Mr. Sykes. 
However, the Court misunderstood some of the evidence, 
improperly refused to admit some of the evidence which would 
have supported Defendant's claims, and improperly admitted 
evidence on behalf of Ms. Anderson and the City. Further, at 
trial, Defendant discovered that the City had in its 
possession documents which had been subpoenaed, but not 
produced in response to a subpoena duces tecum. Finally, 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
providing assistance. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT REACHED ITS DECISION BASED ON FACTS OTHER 
THAN THOSE INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE; ITS WHOLE DECISION WAS 
BASED ON INCORRECT FACTS. 
The Trial Court completely misinterpreted some facts put 
in evidence, and did not understand other facts. One of the 
most telling problems with the Trial court's findings is its 
statement that the testimony of Al Loris was compelling. The 
Court stated "Sometimes a long case can turn on some very 
short evidence... In this case I thought the testimony of Al 
Loris was essentially compelling. .. It's the very next day, 
August 1st." (Tr. 211) . The problem is that the incident 
occurred on the evening of July 29th and the early morning of 
July 30th. The Court very obviously misunderstood Mr. Sykes' 
testimony that he took the dog to a private kennel, and to the 
pound two days later. The Court bases this conclusion on Al 
Loris's testimony that, according to his own notes, Mr. Sykes 
brought the dog in at 7:30 on the 1st of August. However, not 
only does this completely contradict Mr. Sykes' testimony, it 
does not make any sense. Mrs. Anderson testified that the 
incident occurred on July 29th and 30th, and not August 1, as 
understood by the Court. 
6 
The Trial Court mis-cited the date on the back of the 
photos introduced by Defendant as being taken on August 1, 
even though the date on the back of each one is July 30, 1997. 
This is important because, again, the Court used the 
discrepancy in dates as one basis for discounting all of 
Defendant's testimony. The Trial Court found that the dated 
photos introduced by Defendant to show that Mrs. Anderson had 
moved out did not make any sense because they were dated the 
same day he took the dog to Officer Loris. 
The Court also states that another concern of his was 
that the dog died five days after being taken to the pound. 
(Tr. 213). The Court's whole colloquy is to the effect that 
the dog would not have died so soon if all Mr. Sykes did was 
hold it by the scruff of the neck. However, the evidence was 
that the dog died on August 9th, and died because it was 
euthanized. There is no evidence that the dog died of 
anything that Mr. Sykes did or did not do. Mr. Loris 
testified that the dog was euthanized on the 9th. (Tr. 72). 
Interestingly, this would be 8 days from the date which Mr. 
Sykes claims to have took the dog to the pound, and 10 days 
from which Mr. Sykes took the dog to the private kennel, and 
which the Court said was wrong, because of Mr. Loris' notes. 
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Based on the testimony of Mr. Loris, it is much more likely 
that Mr. Sykes' testimony was correct—he took the dog to the 
pound on August 1st, and the pound euthanized it on August 9th. 
Why the pound did so is open to speculation—the City would 
have us believe that it was because the dog was sick, and the 
Court agreed. However, it should be noted that it was not, 
according to Mr. Loris's own testimony, put down until after 
what was logically the end of the 10 day quarantine period. 
These points are important because the Court discounts 
Mr. Sykes testimony because it believes he is lying. The 
Court stated at the beginning of its decision 
"One of the instructions we give juries, *If you find 
that a witness has testified falsely as to a material 
fact, you may, but are not obliged to, disregard all of 
the testimony of that witness.' In this case I thought 
the testimony of Officer Al Loris was essentially 
compelling... It's the very next day, August 1." (Tr. 
210). 
Because it misunderstood the facts presented into 
evidence, the Court decided that Defendant was lying, and all 
of decided that all of Defendant's testimony should be 
discounted. However, the Court reached its conclusion on 
false premises. Mr. Sykes was not lying about what happened. 
The City's own evidence shows that what Mr. Sykes testified to 
is really what likely happened. The Court indicated that 
8 
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another reason that it did not believe Mr. Sykes' testimony 
was that the whole incident just couldn't have occurred as he 
said if his water turn started at 11:40 p.m. (Tr. 215, 216). 
However, the record is explicit that the Defendant's water 
turn started at 11:40 a.m. (Tr. 180, 196, 197). Based on the 
testimony, which was uncontroverted, Mr. Sykes' time frame was 
very workable. However, because the Court believed that Mr. 
Sykes was lying because it misunderstood these facts, it 
completely discounted the rest of Mr. Sykes' testimony. 
Very clearly, the Court based its decision on the wrong 
facts, facts which were not what was introduced by any 
witness. Had the Court correctly understood the facts as 
testified to by even the City's witnesses, it would have to 
reconsider its decision, based on its own statements. 
II. DID THE COURT IMPROPERLY ADMIT HEARSAY EVIDENCE? 
It has long been a rule of evidence that hearsay 
evidence, because of its inherent unreliability, is not 
admissible in court. This is clearly stated in URE §802. Even 
though there are numerous exceptions to this rule, a court is 
still not allowed to admit into evidence hearsay testimony, 
unless the party trying to get it admitted can show that it 
fits within one of the exceptions. Utah Rule of Evidence §802 
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states "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law 
or by these rules." The Court, over repeated objections (Tr. 
82, 83), allowed Officer Carter to testify that the police 
dispatcher told him that the dispatcher had telephoned the 
Sykes residence immediately after taking the call about the 
altercation, and spoken with a female who said she was Mrs. 
Sykes. Very clearly, this is hearsay. The dispatcher was not 
present to testify about her conversation, nor to be cross-
examined about how she had identified the female who answered 
the phone as Mrs. Sykes. 
This admittance of hearsay is important because the Trial 
Court later used it to justify, in part, its finding that 
i 
Defendant was guilty. The Court stated that Mrs. Sykes had 
been lucid enough to answer the phone, but never answered the 
door, and that clearly what occurred was that Mr. Sykes was \ 
not out irrigating, as he testified, but was in the house, 
told his wife to hang up the phone, and that refused to talk 
i 
to the police. (Tr. 217) . The Court refused to allow 
Defendant to introduce evidence that Mrs. Sykes had denied 
ever answering the phone that night, and that the female was < 
probably someone in the basement apartment where a phone jack 
to the upstairs phone remained. But, the Court did allow the 
10 
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hearsay evidence about the whole conversation. The 
prosecution made no attempt to claim that the testimony fell 
within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, and the 
whole conversation should have been excluded. Instead, the 
Court relied in part on this hearsay testimony to decide that 
Defendant was not being truthful, and therefore discounted all 
of the testimony of Defendant. 
In State v. Long, 721 P. 2d 483 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that the hearsay rule has as its declared 
purpose the exclusion of evidence not subject to cross-
examination concerning the truthfulness of the matters 
asserted. This case is the epitome of why the rule exists. 
Defendant should have had the opportunity to challenge the 
accuracy of what was said, to determine how the dispatcher 
knew whom she was talking to over the phone. Instead, the 
prosecution was able to use the hearsay to sway the Court's 
opinion of the veracity of all of Defendant's testimony. Very 
clearly, Officer Carter's testimony about the phone 
conversation should not have been allowed, nor should it have 
been relied on by the Court. 
III. THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY WITHHELD KEY DOCUMENTS FROM 
DEFENDANT WHICH HAD BEEN REQUESTED PURSUANT TO DISCOVERY. 
Attached as Exhibit "A" is Defendant's Subpoena Duces 
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Tecum to the Orem City Police Department. The two returns of 
service show that it was served Sept. 4, 1997 on both 
locations of relevant police records, i.e., served personally 
on Officer Albert Loris, Director of the Orem Police Animal 
Pound, and served personally on the Orem Police Records 
Secretary. This subpoena duces tecum is comprehensive and 
clear in its requirement: 
... in the above entitled action... copies of all 
police files, dates, times, witness statements, police 
notes, reports, comments, records, documents, etc.... 
Include all police records and computer entries and 
printouts obtainable regarding Dwane Sykes and Priscilla 
Anderson during 1997. 
Despite this very clearly broad subpoena, Officer Loris 
intentionally refused and failed to produce certain documents 
which he later used at trial., because they were not spelled 
out by name. The following documents were not produced by 
Officer Loris, despite the subpoena duces tecum very clearly 
stated that they should be produced: Police dog pound intake 
card; handwritten police complaint entry log dated 7/30/97; < 
$20 Ribbonwood Kennel Receipt & Defendant's $20 check; and 
Officer Loris' dog delivery receipt to Sykes. Each of the 
i 
documents withheld from Defendant was an issue raised by the 
Trial Court in determining that Defendant was not being honest 
with the Court, and therefore resulted in Defendant's
 { 
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testimony being discounted. The Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure very clearly state that the prosecutor is "shall" 
produce any and all evidence which tends to mitigate the guilt 
of the Defendant. URCrP 16(a). In the present case, the 
Defendant very clearly subpoenaed these documents, and Officer 
Loris intentionally, by his own testimony, failed to produce 
these documents. By doing so, the prosecution interfered with 
the preparation and presentation of its defense. The 
prosecution obviously felt that these documents were 
important, as it showed when it used these documents at trial. 
However, the prosecution should not have been allowed to 
introduce or use any documents which had been requested but 
not produced. The documents which Defendant is most concerned 
about are the card on which Officer Loris' notes were 
contained; the numerous written reports which Defendant filed 
with the police department regarding the incident; and records 
of the police department that showed that Defendant actually 
did call the department several times regarding the incident. 
IV. DID THE PROSECUTION FAIL TO PROVE GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT? 
The standard that the prosecution must meet in order to 
show a Defendant guilty is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In the present case, there is most definitely a question about 
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whether the prosecution met its burden, based on the points 
raised above. It should be noted again that the Court, in 
order to find Defendant guilty, had to discount completely 
Defendant's testimony, for what have been shown to be spurious 
reasons. Further, the Court had to rely on facts other than 
those presented as evidence by either side. This clearly 
shows that the prosecution did not meet its burden, and but 
for the incorrect facts relied on by the Court, the Defendant 
could not have been found guilty of any of the charges. 
It is particularly important that the Court, in finding 
the Defendant guilty of the assault charge, completely ignored 
Defendant's testimony that Mrs. Anderson was the one who awoke 
angry, and actually charged at Defendant. The Court, by its 
own statement, ignored Defendant's testimony because it found 
he had lied about much of what had happened. The Court found 
that Defendant was lying because of the facts on which it 
decided to rely. However, as shown above, those facts were 
not introduced into evidence, nor shown by the evidence that 
was admitted. Defendant believes that, based on the Court's 
own statements, had the Court understood the evidence 
correctly and relied on what was actually introduced, it could 
not have decided that Defendant was lying and totally 
14 
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discounted his testimony. Further, had the Court not found 
the Defendant had lied, the Court could not have found him 
guilty because there was substantial evidence to support many 
of his claims he testified to. 
V. DID DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY PROVIDE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL? 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides " 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to . . . have the Assistance of counsel for his defence/' 
Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution also provides "In all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel." It is also very 
clear from an abundance of case law that in order to protect 
an individual's constitutional right to legal counsel, the 
counsel that a defendant receives must be "effective". The 
issue then becomes one of what constitutes "effective" 
assistance of counsel. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court outlined 
the standard that must be met by a defendant to establish the 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court stated that the 
proper standard was that the Defendant had to show that, but 
15 
for the counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. 
In the present case, the Defendant believes he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, under both the U. S. and 
Utah Constitutions, for several reasons. First, despite the 
Defendant's request that his attorney request a jury trial, 
his attorney insisted on trying the case to the bench, with 
the obvious result of the Defendant's conviction. Second, 
Defendant's trial counsel failed to object to numerous 
instances of hearsay evidence being presented, and admitted. 
Third, trial counsel failed to properly cross-examine at least 
one witness, Al Loris, when it was clear that there were very 
clear discrepancies in his testimony. Fourth, Defendant's 
trial counsel failed to provide notice as required by law of 
his intent to use an expert witness, who was then not allowed 
to testify. Based on the cumulative effect of these lapses, 
Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. 
In his closing statements, the Judge very clearly stated 
that part of the reason he was discounting most, if not all, 
of the Defendant's testimony was because it did not coincide 
with the testimony of Al Loris, whom the Court considered to 
be the prosecution's most telling witness. (Tr. 211). 
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However, had Defendant's trial counsel adequately cross-
examined Mr. Loris, he could have established that the time 
frame outlined by Mr. Loris did not make any sense, in light 
of when the rest of the incident occurred. Based on Mr. Loris' 
testimony, the court had to assume that the dog pound 
proceeded to put the dog to sleep within five days of its 
being brought in, contrary to its own guidelines. It is 
obvious that there was a very serious discrepancy in the 
evidence and the time frame in which each event of the 
incident occurred. Defendant's trial counsel should have 
taken great pains to make clear the time at which everything 
occurred. Instead, he left it up to the Court to try and 
figure out how to resolve the discrepancies. The Court chose 
to do so by disbelieving everything the Defendant testified 
to, no matter how incredulous the resulting interpretation. 
Based on the Court's statement on how it arrived at its 
decision, had Defendant's counsel adequately shown the 
problems with Mr. Loris' testimony, the Court may very well 
have decided the case differently. The Court would have had 
no reason to discount most, if not all, of Defendant's 
testimony, and Defendant's testimony would have been in fact 
17 
corroborated by the testimony of the only truly independent 
witness to testify. 
Defendant's counsel also failed to object to most of the 
hearsay testimony offered by the prosecution; again, this 
shows that counsel was ineffective. Had the Court been forced 
to rule on the hearsay evidence that was presented, it may 
well have been forced, and wanted, to rely more on Defendant's 
testimony than it obviously did. 
The third instance showing that Defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel is shown by trial counsel's 
failure to file the notice of appeal. It is a matter of 
record that Defendant filed his own notice of appeal, and many 
of the subsequent documents. Immediately after the trial, 
Defendant asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal; even 
after repeated requests to do so, Defendant's trial counsel to 
do so, and Defendant ultimately had file his own notice, in 
order to preserve his right to appeal. Defendant should not 
have been forced to file his own notice of appeal in order to 
preserve his right to have the trial court's decision 
reviewed. 
18 
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CONCLUSION 
As can be seen from the above, there were numerous errors 
in the trial of Defendant, the cumulative effect of which 
justifies a new trial. Defendant was obviously found guilty 
based on facts which were not presented as evidence by either 
party, at least as stated by the Court; hearsay evidence, 
which became in part the basis for the finding of guilt, was 
admitted over the objection of Defendant's attorney; the 
prosecution did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as 
shown by the Court's reliance on facts which were not ever 
presented by either party; key documents, which were requested 
by Defendant through a subpoena duces tecum, were withheld, 
intentionally, by the prosecution and police; and Defendant's 
trial counsel was ineffective, as shown by his lack of 
knowledge of criminal procedure and his failure to file the 
request for a new trial or notice of appeal. As noted 
earlier, the cumulative effect of these errors deprived 
Defendant of a fair hearing as guaranteed by both the U.S. and 
Utah Constitutions. Accordingly, the case should be remanded 
for a new trial. 
19 
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DATED this 2/"1 day of August, 1999 
Randy M. Lish 
Attorney for Defendant 
20 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of August, 1999, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to Robert Church, Orem City Prosecutor, 97 E. 
Center, Orem, UT 84057. 
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ADDENDUM 
I 
( 
i 
_ 0(W 
4TH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
CITY OF OREM, 
PkurJij? 
DWANE J . SYKES 
1511 South Carter-vine Rd, 
Orem, Utah 34097 
vs. 
Defendants1, 
(Include address and DOE) 
SUBPOENA 
DUCES TECUM 
xsxmxra 
Criminal No. 
971-1214 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: 
(Name) {Address} (Dare Served] 
OREM CITY, POLICE,RECORDS DIVISION Orem City Bldq. St & Center St. Sept. 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear and give testimony in the above-entitled actJon. before 
the above court at the following time and place: to prcduce copies of all police case f i l e s , da1 
ss, witness statements, police notes, reports, comments, records, documents, per atLcched pj 
Hand- Delivery immediately upon receipt , wi tPSSv copies not immediately available promptr? maued to: 
m c c
 Dwane Sykes, 1511 South Carterville Rd., Orem, Utah 34097-7244 (oh. 225-0! 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers, documents, or 
other items: see above and attached pages. Include all police records and computer entr 
its obtainable regarding 5Wane Sykes and Pricillia Anderson during 1997. 
If you fail to obey this subpoena, the court may issue a waiTanpfesfflKSs^ rrest. 
Date Sept.-3; 1997 
INSTRUCTIONS TO WITNESS 
To receive payment of your witness fee and mileage: (1) bring this subpoena with you to court, (2) 
present the subpoena to clerk of the COUIT, and (3) sign the witness book. Payment will be mailed to you. 
SFAS»021» 
